

ATHEX

Athens Stock Exchange

Remuneration Policy

“Hellenic Exchanges – Athens Stock Exchange S.A.”

Approved by the Extraordinary General Meeting of 01.04.2026 and registered on XX.04.2026 with the General Commercial Registry number

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1. Introduction

- 1.1. This remuneration policy (the “**Policy**”) applies to the company under the corporate name “HELLENIC EXCHANGES – ATHENS STOCK EXCHANGE S.A.” (the “**Company**”) and has been drafted in accordance with the Company’s Articles of Association, Articles 110 and 111 of Greek Law 4548/2018 (the “**Corporate Law**”), transposing into Greek law the relevant provisions of Shareholders’ Rights Directive (EU) 2017/828 and Greek Law 4706/2020 on Corporate Governance (the “**Corporate Governance Law**”). The Policy further follows the Hellenic Corporate Governance Code which has been adopted by the Company and has taken into account the best international and local practices.
- 1.2. The Policy sets forth the basic principles and rules regarding the remuneration of the Non-Executive members of the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), intending to increase corporate transparency and the accountability of said persons, and to allow shareholders, potential investors and stakeholders to assess their remuneration, including the extent to which their remuneration is linked to the performance and strategy of the Company.

2. Duration & Scope

- 2.1. The Policy is submitted to a binding vote by the General Meeting at every material change and, in any case, at least every four (4) years under the procedure set out in this Policy.
- 2.2. Remuneration covers any type of compensation or payment, fees and benefits of any kind received by the Non-Executive members of the Board of Directors as well as the CEO, which is paid directly or indirectly by the Company or (where applicable in the context of the present Remuneration Policy) , for the provision of professional services under an employment contract or otherwise (e.g. project or mandate contract).
- 2.3. In accordance with Article 110 of Corporate Law and Article 15(1) of the Company’s Articles of Association, the Policy applies to the members of the Company’s Board of Directors and CEO.
- 2.4. In particular, the Policy applies to the following persons:
 - (1) Non-Executive members of the Board of Directors.
 - (2) The Chief Executive Officer (CEO).
- 2.5. Stock awards under section 7.3 of the Policy shall be granted to employees of the Company or any affiliated companies, the Board of Directors may deem eligible by means of a resolution of the Board of Directors (the “**LTIP Beneficiaries**”).

3. Remuneration governance

- 3.1. The present Policy is approved and reviewed by decision of the general meeting of shareholders (the “**General Meeting**”), upon proposal of the Board of Directors (non-executive members), following recommendation of the nomination and compensation committee of the Company (the “**Nomination and Compensation Committee**” or “**NCC**”). In discharging its duties, the NCC may cooperate with other committees of the Board of Directors, if deemed necessary. The Compliance Unit and the Human

Resources Unit of the Company, each within its competencies, shall assist the Board of Directors and the NCC in the development, review and implementation of the Policy. To that end, the aforementioned units may cooperate with other units of the Company, such as those competent for risk and strategy, whenever deemed necessary.

- 3.2.** The Policy shall be reviewed annually by the Board of Directors following a recommendation of the NCC as regards its implementation, its ongoing compliance with the applicable legal and regulatory framework, and its alignment with economic and market conditions. The Policy may be revised upon a proposal of the NCC, taking into consideration the advisory vote of the General Meeting on the Remuneration Report (as defined below).
- 3.3.** The duties of the Board of Directors as regards remuneration include, upon recommendation of the NCC, monitoring, reviewing and periodically updating the procedures and conditions for the award of remuneration to ensure that they are aligned both with the Company's business objectives and the applicable regulatory framework.
- 3.4.** Subject to any additional responsibilities under the applicable laws and its rulebook of operations, the NCC is responsible to:
1. make proposals to the Board of Directors regarding the Policy submitted to the General Meeting for approval, in accordance with Article 110(2) of Corporate Law;
 2. make proposals to the Board of Directors regarding the Remuneration of the persons falling within the scope of the Policy; and
 3. review the information included in the final draft of the Remuneration Report, providing its opinion to the Board of Directors before submitting the report to the General Meeting, in accordance with Article 112 of Corporate Law.
- 3.5.** Subject to section 3.6 of the Policy, the amount of the remuneration (fixed and/or variable remuneration and/or other benefits) to be paid to the members of the Board of Directors shall be determined by the Board of Directors on an annual basis, following a recommendation of the NCC, and is subject to approval by the Annual General Meeting.
- 3.6.** The conclusion of a special relationship agreement (such as, but not limited to, an employment, project or mandate contract) with the executive members of the Board of Directors, or any amendment thereto, is subject to approval in accordance with the relevant provisions of Corporate Law and the applicable legislation on related party transactions, as in force from time to time.
- 3.7.** The internal audit department of the Company shall audit the implementation of the Policy at least once (1) per year.

4. Basic principles

- 4.1.** The Policy links the pay structure for the non-executive members of the Board of Directors as well as the CEO, to the Company's business strategy, long-term interests and financial performance and reinforces a culture of continuous improvement and development, to maximize the value of the Company for all stakeholders, its customers, shareholders and employees and the Greek economy, while encouraging appropriate

and necessary management of risks.

4.2. The Policy contributes to the Company's business strategy, long-term interests and financial performance by relying on the following main principles:

(1) **Performance maximization:** The remuneration of the CEO, includes, besides the fixed component, short and long-term variable components as reward for his/ her contribution to the overall success of the business, the creation of value and the building of a dedicated client base.

(2) **Long-term value creation:** Remuneration is designed to support the Company's business plan, so that it continues to create long-term value for its clients, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders and promote sustainable growth. The Policy intends to achieve the above objectives by ensuring fair and appropriate fixed remuneration and short and long-term variable remuneration components, which encourage sustainable growth and shareholder value-creation.

(3) **Attraction, motivation and retention of talent:** The Company aims to provide incentives to attract, recruit, motivate and retain talent of the calibre required to implement its strategy.

(4) **Equal remuneration:** The Company aims to provide equal pay for equal work, work of equal value and work **rated** as equivalent, considering skills, effort, responsibility and working conditions, and, if appropriate, any other factors which are relevant to the specific job or position, regardless of gender, age, disability, religion, race, nationality or origin, gender identity and/or expression, sexual orientation, or any other status protected by applicable law.

(5) **Prevention of conflicts of interest:** Remuneration shall align the interests of the non-executive members of the Board of Directors as well as the CEO with the interests of the Company and its shareholders and shall not give rise to conflicts of interest or provide incentives to the non-executive members of the Board of Directors as well as the CEO to promote their interests or third parties' interests to the detriment of the interests of the Company and its shareholders.

(6) **Prudent risk management:** In order to determine the appropriate level of remuneration, the risk management framework, which sets the guidelines of managing risks, whether those arise in course of the Company's main activities, or own funds investment, and the collateral posted by clearing and trading members, and its key elements that can be associated, directly or indirectly, with risk-related performance, are considered. The Company's risk management framework includes a set of procedures, internal documents and measures aimed at risk identification, evaluation and modification of risks, as well as monitoring their status in order to mitigate or optimize the Company's financial exposure due to an adverse change of risk factors. The Company is developing and implementing a risk-appetite framework in order to control the level of most significant risks.

(7) **Transparency:** Any additional remuneration paid to the non-executive members of the Board of Directors as well as the CEO shall be fully presented in section 8 of the Remuneration Report ("Derogations and deviations from the Remuneration Policy").

(8) **Compliance with applicable laws:** Remuneration levels in the Company must always be compliant with the applicable legal and regulatory framework.

4.3. In determining the remuneration of the non-executive members of the Board of Directors and/ or the CEO, the Company takes into consideration the relevant practices in place, intending to ensure that all employees are paid appropriately in the context of their role, experience and performance and that a fair and reasonable remuneration is paid to the most suitable persons for each position. In particular, the Company aims to ensure that the remuneration practices and structure are largely consistent, noting though that the remuneration of the non-executive members of the Board of Directors and CEO must be different than the remuneration paid to the Company's employees due to their role and responsibility, as well as their ability to affect the Company's performance. The Board of Directors, upon consultation with the NCC, closely monitors the development of remuneration practices in the Company and periodically updates the Board of Directors concerning employee remuneration practices within the Company.

5. Remuneration components

5.1. Structure of remuneration

- 5.1.1.** Remuneration may include a fixed component, a short-term and/or long-term variable component and other benefits, as further specified in the Policy. Moreover, the non-executive members of the Board of Directors and/or the CEO may claim reasonable business (including travel, accommodation and vocational training) expenses, within the terms of the Company's expenses policy and be reimbursed on a similar basis as all employees.
- 5.1.2.** Periodic benchmarking against the market, reflecting the responsibilities and complexity of the role, is used to provide context when setting the remuneration components of section 5.2 hereof.
- 5.1.3.** A summary table of remuneration and other benefits for the non-executive members of the Board of Directors as well as the CEO is set out below.

Capacity	Fixed remuneration	Short-term Variable remuneration	Long-term Variable remuneration	Other benefits	Expenses
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)	X	X	X	x	x
Non-executive members of the Board of Directors	X				x

5.2. Remuneration components

- 5.2.1. Fixed remuneration:** Fixed remuneration refers to payments, which (i) are granted on a regular periodic basis and are based on predetermined criteria; (ii) are permanent, i.e. maintained over a period tied to each specific role and organizational responsibilities; and (iii) do not depend on performance.

5.2.2. Variable remuneration: Variable remuneration includes additional bonus (cash) payments, share grants, awards over shares, or other benefits granted as a reward for (or dependent upon) performance, including but not limited to the achievement of operational and financial targets as set out at least annually by the Board of Directors for the CEO. The granting of variable remuneration remains at the absolute discretion of the Company and can be freely revoked, in whole or in part, at any time unilaterally by the Company.

Payment of variable remuneration components is mandatorily deferred if the financial health of the Company deteriorates significantly, or conditions exist that may lead to substantial doubt about the going concern of the Company or affect the ability of the Company to meet any capital requirements under the applicable legal and regulatory framework.

Variable remuneration aims to incentivize performance maximization and reasonable risk-taking, as well as to link remuneration to sustainable financial performance and shareholder value creation of the Company. Variable remuneration is linked to: (i) seniority and the criticality of the role; and (ii) performance-based elements, as set out in more detail below. Both financial and non-financial objectives will be measurable and reportable, in line with past performance, and will support the Company's strategy. Variable remuneration will take into account a combination of specific absolute and relative key performance indicators ("KPIs"), as described under section 7 below.

5.2.3. Other benefits: Other benefits are granted to attract, motivate and retain talent, and are described in and capped by the relevant Benefits Policy of the Company.

5.2.4. Expenses: The non-executive members of the Board of Directors and/ or the CEO may claim reasonable business expenses (including expenses related to travel, accommodation, client/hospitality and vocational training for non-executive board members), in line with the Company's relevant policies and procedures and be reimbursed accordingly.

5.3. Other

5.3.1. Executive members of the Board of Directors who are employees of the Company do not receive any additional remuneration on top of their salary as Company's employees for the performance of their duties as executive members of the Board of Directors.

5.3.2. At the time of the approval of this Policy, the Company has entered into a single employment contract of indefinite duration, with one (1) executive member of the Board of Directors the Company's appointed CEO.

6. Remuneration of non-executive members of the Board of Directors

6.1. Remuneration of the non-executive members of the Board of Directors includes the following elements:

6.1.1. Fixed remuneration: The non-executive members of the Board of Directors receive fixed remuneration for the time commitment required for the performance of their duties. Additional fixed base remuneration may be paid to the non-executive members of the Board of Directors for their participation in the committees of the Board of Directors to reflect their increased time commitment. The fixed base remuneration is not performance-based. Instead, it considers the responsibilities of the role, the skills and knowledge required as well as the expected time commitment and broader economic and inflationary conditions.

6.1.2. Variable Remuneration: No variable remuneration is granted to the non-executive members of the Board of Directors.

6.1.3. Expenses: The non-executive members of the Board of Directors may claim reasonable business expenses (including expenses related to travel, accommodation, client/hospitality and vocational training) and be reimbursed on a similar basis as all employees, as per the terms of the Company's expense reimbursement policy.

6.2. The Board of Directors, upon recommendation of the NCC, evaluates the adequacy of the fixed remuneration of the non-executive members of the Board of Directors on an annual basis. When considering the eligibility of the non-executive members of the Board of Directors for an increase of the fixed base remuneration, the NCC takes into account relevant market benchmarking, the responsibilities of the role, any increases awarded to the wider workforce of the Company and its group, the individual and Company performance and the overall financial outlook of the Greek economy.

6.3. For the avoidance of doubt, employees of the Euronext Group which are not directly employed by the Company do not receive any additional remuneration related to their role of Company's director.

7. Remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer

7.1. Overview

7.1.1. Remuneration may include the following components:

Fixed remuneration

Link to business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability	Level of remuneration	Link to performance
<p>Fixed remuneration is not performance-based but aims to reward the awarded persons for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> their position (tasks and responsibilities) and its relevance to the Company's operations; and the experience and the time commitment required for the performance of their duties. 	<p>When setting the remuneration levels the Company considers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the organisational structure and hierarchy; the job evaluation; the salary and employment conditions in the Company; the formal and substantive qualification required for the role; the prevailing market conditions, the competitive environment, after due consideration of the levels of fixed remuneration paid by other (comparable) companies of similar size and business for similar positions, education, skills required for the position, experience and responsibilities, as well as the positioning and relativities of pay and employment conditions; and the broader economic and inflationary conditions in the country of residence. 	<p>When considering the eligibility for an increase of the fixed remuneration, the Board of Directors considers, besides the responsibilities of the role, the market practices and the overall financial outlook, also the Company's performance and the outcome of the annual individual performance assessment. Significant salary increases must be explained by a detailed and compelling rationale.</p>

Variable remuneration – Short Term Incentive Plan (STIP)

Link to business strategy, annual business plan and sustainability	Level of STIP	Link to performance
<p>Short-term variable remuneration may be granted as an incentive to reinforce performance, commitment, motivation and discretionary effort. The primary objective of the STIP is to achieve the annual budget and other annual strategic objectives that are financial and non-financial.</p>	<p>When setting or reviewing the STIP target and maximum award, the Company considers, as the case may be, the following factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ the successful implementation of the Company's corporate strategy and the contribution of the eligible persons to such successful implementation; ▪ the Company's financial results and the contribution of the eligible persons to the achievement of the Company's business and financial targets, including its profitability; ▪ the performance of the eligible persons based on their evaluation, the responsibility assumed as well as the nature and the characteristics of the services offered to the Company; and ▪ periodic relevant market benchmarking, reflecting the size and complexity of the role. 	<p>The Company ensures an appropriate balance in the determination of STIP payouts to disincentivize unreasonable risk-taking that focuses only on short-term business success.</p>

Variable remuneration – Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP)

Link to business strategy, long-term business plan and sustainability	Level of LTIP	Link to performance
<p>Long-term variable remuneration may be granted to enhance retention, attract talent and incentivize eligible persons to meet long-term performance objectives that are typically relative or absolute and related directly to shareholder return or other long-term financial achievements.</p>	<p>When setting or reviewing an executive's LTIP target and maximum award, the Company considers, as the case may be, the following factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ the contribution of each eligible person to the successful implementation of the Company's corporate strategy; ▪ the contribution of each eligible person to the achievement of the Company's long-term business and financial targets; ▪ periodic relevant market benchmarking, reflecting the size and complexity of the role. 	<p>The Company ensures an appropriate balance in the determination of LTIP payouts to disincentivize unreasonable risk-taking and ensure long-term shareholder returns.</p>

Other benefits

Link to business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability	Level of remuneration	Link to performance

The Company may grant additional benefits with the aim of attracting, motivating and retaining executive talent.

Other benefits may include participation in a company health plan, participation in a company pension plan, use of a corporate car, the financing of relevant studies, training, professional certifications and conference attendances, access to an employee assistance program, provision of family member/child benefits and directors & officers (D&O) insurance to adequately protect them from claims which may arise from decisions and actions taken as part of their duties. The Company may consider additional benefits to attract, motivate and retain executive talent, in line with its policies and relevant market benchmarking.

Other benefits incentivize performance and contribute to the well-being of Executive members of the Board of Directors.

Expenses

Reasonable business expenses (including travel, accommodation and client/hospitality-related expenses) may be claimed and reimbursed on a similar basis as all employees as per the terms of the Company's expense reimbursement policy and procedures.

7.2. Short-term incentive plan ("STIP")

- 7.2.1.** The STIP aims to provide greater motivation to achieve and maintain the highest standards of performance, attract, motivate and retain executives of outstanding competence, and support the achievement of the annual budget and other specific annual strategic financial and non-financial business goals set for the Company.
- 7.2.2.** The STIP is an annual incentive plan settled in cash that is paid out in the 1st half of the next fiscal year following validation of the performance objectives as further specified herein.
- 7.2.3.** The STIP is primarily based on the achievement of the annual financial budget to ensure the company profitability is protected. The STIP objectives will be set annually for the relevant year and shall include a majority of financial targets and strategic targets and minority of individual targets. The targets that are set for the CEO are challenging but realistic. All STIP objectives are supportive of the long-term strategy of the Company and are aligned with shareholder interests. These performance criteria are to a large extent linked to quantitative objectively measurable targets and are communicated and tracked in individual STIP scorecards. For the individual targets only, some discretionary elements are introduced whereby the Board of Directors can use judgment and specific circumstances to allow for a fair and proper decision.

7.3. Long-term incentive plan ("LTIP")

- 7.3.1.** The LTIP is a performance share-based plan. The aim of the LTIP is to enhance retention, attract talent and incentivize LTIP Beneficiaries to meet long-term performance objectives.
- 7.3.2.** Since the Company is a subsidiary of Euronext N.V. in the meaning of article 2:24a of the Dutch Civil Code, Euronext N.V. performance shares may be granted to the LTIP Beneficiaries.
- 7.3.3.** The main features of the LTIP arrangements of Euronext N.V. are (i) equity awards will be made in the form of Performance Shares ("Performance Shares") with a three-year cliff vesting schedule ("Performance Share Plan"), (ii) the provisional and conditional target grant of LTI for the CEO will be a percentage of Annual Fixed Salary (please see table below) and (iii) at vesting, the actual number of shares to be delivered will be determined taking into

consideration the performance of the Euronext Group as stated in the plan.

7.3.4. The shares to be distributed to the LTIP Beneficiaries (in satisfaction of the vesting of their awards) will be treasury shares of Euronext N.V. (the “**Performance Shares**”).

7.4. Proportion of fixed and variable remuneration components

7.4.1. STIP as a percentage of base pay

Performance	CEO
Lower than the minimum acceptable level	0%
At target	50%
At maximum level	75%

7.4.2. LTIP as a percentage of base pay (estimated annualized face value of the award to be granted under the LTIP)

Performance	CEO
Lower than the minimum acceptable level	0%
At target	50%
At maximum level	100%

Notes:

1. *The Board of Directors, following the proposal of the NCC, may propose a change in the final STIP payment amount of the CEO taking into account the macroeconomic environment and conditions that may affect corporate performance. In this case, the percentages in the above table are adjusted accordingly. In any case, the variable remuneration of the CEO may not exceed the percentages in the above table which correspond to the maximum level of performance.*
2. *The STIP payment is zero for all executive members of the Board of Directors, in case the Company does not achieve the lowest acceptable profitability target.*

7.4.3. The criteria used and the corresponding performance will be clearly set out in the Annual Remuneration Report.

7.4.4. The proportion of annual variable remuneration in the form of LTIP and STIP to annual fixed remuneration can vary up to the percentages defined in the table below and is linked to the level of performance of the CEO. The table below shows the target pay-mix as a percentage of total direct compensation, i.e. of the total sum of fixed remuneration, STIP and annualized LTIP:

Role	Fixed remuneration	STIP	LTIP
CEO	50%	25%	25%

7.5. Payment of variable remuneration to leavers

- 7.5.1.** Short Term Incentives are not part of any recurring compensation, not acquired nor payable prorata temporis, and are subject to presence in the Company.
- 7.5.2.** Unless otherwise decided at its discretion by the Board of Directors, and in accordance to the Euronext N.V. Performance Share Plan, in the event of a resignation, dismissal, contractual termination, or in the event of a revocation, all LTI Beneficiaries' rights to Performance Shares shall lapse in full, without further notice, upon sending of the resignation letter, as of the receipt of the dismissal letter, as of the effective contractual termination, or the revocation notification, without any compensation being due.

7.6. Application of malus/clawback provisions

7.6.1. STIP

Without prejudice to the provisions of the applicable regulatory and contractual framework, variable remuneration paid may be reclaimed ("clawback") in certain circumstances, including where:

- there has been a materially adverse misstatement or misrepresentation of any part of the financial statements or the results of the Company or any entity belonging to the group of the Company (a "Group Company");
- an error in (i) determining the size and nature of the award, or in the award documentation, or (ii) assessing the extent to which any performance condition was met, or such determination or assessment was based on inaccurate or misleading information or assumptions;
- the Company has reasonable evidence of fraud, gross misconduct, dishonesty or other behaviour which would have entitled the employer of the executive member of the Board of Directors to summarily dismiss her/him;
- the executive member of the Board of Directors has acted in any manner which in the opinion of the Board (i) has resulted, or is likely to result, in the Company or any Group Company suffering serious reputational damage, and/or (ii) is materially adverse to the interests of the Company or any Group Company;
- the Board of Directors determines that a Group Company or business unit that employs or employed the executive member of the Board of Directors, or for which the executive member of the Board of Directors is or was (in whole or as to a material part) responsible, has suffered a corporate failure, material financial downturn, material failure of risk management, material failure to comply with relevant laws or regulations, or the occurrence of an event which is, in the opinion of the Board, a serious health and safety event, in each case which is due (in whole or in part) to the actions or omissions of the STIP beneficiary.

7.6.2. LTIP

The Board of Directors may, in its absolute discretion and in accordance to the Euronext N.V. Performance Share Plan, decide at any time prior to the vesting of an LTIP award to reduce the number of shares to which the award relates (including to nil) in certain circumstances.

- 7.6.3.** The executive member of the Board of Directors can be required, in accordance to the Euronext NV Performance Share Plan, to give back some or all of the shares received pursuant

to an LTIP award (or pay an amount equal to the value of such shares) if, within two years of an award vesting, the Board becomes aware that any of the events described above under 7.6.1. have occurred. The clawback obligation can be enforced in various ways, including against any other awards the executive member of the Board of Directors holds (including STIP awards).

8. Pension benefits

- 8.1.** Pension benefits of the executive members of the Board of Directors may consist of various state pension and additional fixed contribution pension schemes that are in line with local practices in Greece. Such pension benefits are not based on performance. Periodic relevant market benchmarking is used to provide context when determining and reviewing the appropriateness of the pension benefits provided to the executive members of the Board of Directors.
- 8.2.** There are no early retirement schemes in place for the executive members of the Board of Directors.

9. Severance payments

- 9.1.** Severance payments means payments to the executive members of the Board of Directors relating to the early termination of a contract, i.e. in the case of definite contracts, termination before the end date of the contract and in the case of indefinite contracts, before the contractual or legal retirement, by the Company.
- 9.2.** Severance payments to the executive members of the Board of Directors having an employment contract with the Company will be determined against statutory labour law requirements and any relevant provisions in the individual contract with the Company.
- 9.3.** In order to facilitate the planned and timely succession, and in order to support the responsible separation process of executive members of the Board of Directors, the Company may grant discretionary severance payments in cash, which may take into account factors such as individual performance over time and length of service at the Company, among others, following the conclusion of a consensual termination agreement. No severance payments over and above what is prescribed by law are granted in case of voluntary departures that do not include the conclusion of a consensual termination agreement or in cases of significant inadequate performance.
- 9.4.** The total sum of severance payments under this section 9 shall not exceed a total of two (2) years gross salary/fees (severance payment cap), unless otherwise required by law or agreed in the individual contract with the Company.

10. Significance of additional remuneration of independent non-executive members within the meaning of article 9(2) (a) of Corporate Governance Law

- 10.1.** The independent non-executive members of the Board of Directors may not receive any significant additional remuneration or benefit or participate in a stock option plan

or any other performance-based remuneration or benefit plan, other than the remuneration for their participation in the Board of Directors or its committees, in accordance with Article 9(2)(a) of Corporate Governance Law.

10.2. For the purposes of Article 9(2)(a) of the Corporate Governance Law, the additional compensation or benefit of the non-executive directors (other than the remuneration for their participation in the Board of Directors or its committees) is considered significant if:

1. it is associated with the short-term financial performance of the Company;
2. it creates strong incentives for the non-executive member of the Board of Directors to achieve corporate goals, which can increase the Company's exposure to risks;
3. it depends on the results of the Company;
4. due to its amount and/or nature, it is likely to affect the independent judgment of a member of the Board of Directors (ad hoc or occasional compensation is not considered to affect the independence of the member); or

10.3. In any case, the remuneration shall not lead to a business or financial relationship of the member of the Board of Directors with the Company, within the meaning of Article 9(1) of Corporate Governance Law, which can impact his/her decisions and independent and objective judgment.

11. Conflicts of interest

11.1. The applicable law and regulations and the Company's Conflict of Interest Policy shall apply regarding the measures to be taken to avoid conflicts of interest and the actions that may be necessary to manage actual or potential conflicts of interest.

11.2. The Company's Conflict of Interest Policy, amongst others, provides for the evaluation of an incident and, depending on its importance, may provide for:

- the persons concerned to refrain from any participation in discussions and decision-making procedures (e.g. voting) regarding the issue underlying the incident;
- the exclusion from participation in committees or working groups dealing with the relevant matter;
- limiting the access of the person concerned to confidential information related to the incident; or
- the delegation of the responsibilities of the person concerned to another person.

12. Shareholding guidelines

12.1. The Company's Chief Executive Officer is expected to build up share ownership over a period of 5 years, arising from the vested share awards over time. Hence, (s)he begins accumulating from the first vesting year, i.e. in 2029. The minimum shareholding requirement is 150% of base salary for the CEO.

13. Extraordinary deviations from the Policy

- 13.1. In exceptional circumstances, a deviation from the Policy shall be permitted, provided that:
- a relevant recommendation is submitted by the NCC to the Board of Directors for approval;
 - the proposed deviation concerns variable remuneration or the severance payments of the executive members of the Board of Directors (e.g. in case of change of control); and
 - the deviation is deemed necessary to serve the long-term interests of the Company as a whole or to ensure its viability.
- 13.2. Any deviations from the procedure for the implementation of the Policy and any derogations from the Policy itself shall be described in the Remuneration Report which is submitted to the Annual General Meeting, including:
- an indication of the specific elements deviated from and a confirmation that the Policy allows these elements to be deviated or derogated from;
 - an explanation of the nature of the exceptional circumstances including an explanation of why the deviation is necessary to serve the long-term interest and sustainability of the Company as a whole or to assure its viability; and
 - information on the procedure followed and confirmation that this procedure complies with the procedural conditions that are specified in the Policy for these exceptional circumstances.

14. Remuneration Report

- 14.1. The Board of Directors will prepare and publish a comprehensive and informative remuneration report in accordance with article 112 of Corporate Law (the “**Remuneration Report**”), which will contain, among other things, a comprehensive overview of the total remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors paid during the previous financial year. Subject to specific requirements on personal data protection under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), the Remuneration Report shall be published and remain available, free of charge, on the Company's website [[Athens Exchange Group - athexgroup.gr](https://athexgroup.gr)] for at least ten (10) years.
- 14.2. The annual General Meeting holds an advisory vote on the remuneration report of the most recent financial year. The Company shall explain in each Remuneration Report that follows how the vote by the Annual General Meeting has been taken into account.

15. Publications

The Policy, along with the date and results of the General Meeting's vote, must be made public and remain accessible on the Company's website [[Athens Exchange Group - athexgroup.gr](https://athexgroup.gr)] for the duration of its validity.

Annex

Summary of the main amendments of the Remuneration Policy

Scope

The scope has been changed following the amendment of article 15 of the company's AoA; in such context, the Remuneration Policy is applicable only to BoD members and, thus, references to Key Personnel throughout the text have been erased. The general scope of the Policy has been focused on the CEO compensation framework. Definitions have been adjusted to reflect the change of LTIP.

Basic Principles

The basic principles underlying the Policy have remained unchanged, noting adjustment to the new scope.

Remuneration Components

The variable remuneration components have been amended to adjust the LTIP to grant shares in the form of Euronext N.V. Performance Shares.

Short-term incentive plan (STIP)

The STIP is retained as an annual incentive plan settled in cash that is paid out in the 1st half of the next fiscal year following validation of the performance objectives.

The STIP objectives have been clarified and will be a majority of financial targets and strategic targets and minority of individual targets. The targets that are set for the CEO are challenging but realistic. All STIP objectives are supportive of the long-term strategy of the Company and are aligned with shareholder interests. These performance criteria are to a large extent linked to quantitative objectively measurable targets and are communicated and tracked in individual STIP scorecards. For the individual targets only, some discretionary elements are introduced whereby the Board of Directors can use judgment and specific circumstances to allow for a fair and proper decision.

Long-term incentive plan (LTIP)

The LTIP has been adjusted to consider the Company being a subsidiary of Euronext N.V. in the meaning of article 2:24a of the Dutch Civil Code. Euronext N.V. performance shares may be granted to the LTIP Beneficiaries.

LTIP Beneficiaries are employees of the Company or any affiliated companies according to IAS 24, the Board of Directors may deem eligible by means of a resolution of the Board of Directors.

The main features of the LTIP are summarized below:

- (1) Equity awards will be made in the form of performance shares with a three-year cliff vesting schedule.
 - (2) The provisional and conditional target grant of LTI will be a percentage of Annual Fixed Salary.
 - (3) At vesting date, the actual number of shares to be delivered will be determined taking into consideration the performance of Euronext.
 - (4) Subject to the provisions of this Policy, all other details of the LTIP will be contained in the Euronext N.V. Performance Shares Plan documentation.
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Proportion of fixed and variable remuneration components

The proportion of fixed and variable remuneration components is amended due to the adjustment of the target LTI for the CEO.

Payment of variable remuneration to leavers

The Policy is adjusted to clarify the detailed provisions concerning the conditions for payment of variable remuneration to leavers as follows:

- (1) Short Term Incentives are not part of any recurring compensation, not acquired nor payable pro rata temporis, and are therefore subject to presence in the company.
 - (2) Unless otherwise decided at its discretion by the Board of Directors, and in accordance to the Euronext N.V. Performance Share Plan, in the event of a resignation, dismissal, contractual termination, or in the event of a revocation, all LTIP Beneficiaries' rights to Performance Shares shall lapse in full, without further notice, upon sending of the resignation letter, as of the receipt of the dismissal letter, as of the effective contractual termination, or the revocation notification, without any compensation being due.
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Application of malus /clawback provisions

The Policy introduces detailed provisions concerning the Malus & Clawback Circumstances as follows:

(1) **STIP**

Without prejudice to the provisions of the applicable regulatory and contractual framework, variable remuneration paid may be reclaimed ("clawback").

(2) **LTIP**

The Board of Directors may, in its absolute discretion and in accordance of the Euronext N.V. Performance Shares Plan, decide at any time prior to the vesting of an LTIP award to reduce the number of shares to which the award relates (including to nil) in certain circumstances.

Shareholding guidelines

The shareholding guidelines are unchanged for the CEO.